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9. Intergovernmental transfers: 
a policy reform perspective
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and 
Cristian Sepulveda*
1 INTRODUCTION
A num ber o f Latin American countries have now accum ulated several 
decades o f experience with fiscal decentralization reforms. Although 
considerable progress has been made on many fronts, that experience has 
not helped to avoid some serious com m on pitfalls in the assignment of 
revenue sources to subnational governm ents in the region.1 Subnational 
finances in Latin America are generally characterized by relatively small 
shares o f own-revenue collections and non-existing o r -  with some rare 
exceptions poorly designed equalization transfer program s.2 In this 
chapter we argue that the use (and abuse) o f revenue-sharing schemes in 
the region has prevented the development o f sound financial structures at 
the subnational level.
The com parative advantages o f  subnational governm ents with respect 
to  the central government are usually concentrated on the expenditure side 
o f the budget. Because o f this, expenditure decentralization is usually more 
pervasive than revenue decentralization, and intergovernm ental transfers 
play a crucial role in the fiscal balance o f almost all fiscally decentralized 
systems. The main challenge for an intergovernm ental transfer system is 
the com puting and timely delivery o f the right am ount o f transfers to each 
subnational government. Failing to do this well can result in sending out 
the wrong signals regarding the efficient level o f public expenditures at 
the subnational level, thus eroding the efficiency gains expected from the 
decentralization process itself. These are, in our opinion, some o f the risks 
currently faced by many Latin American countries. Their heavy reliance 
on revenue-sharing schemes and the lack o f clarity about the role and 
proper com position o f the transfer system has in many cases led to an inef­
ficient distribution o f revenues com bined with significant horizontal fiscal 
imbalances.
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The situation has not been helped by the fact that the academic litera­
ture does not provide delinite advice about the optimal composition of 
subnational revenues. In particular, the current academic literature does 
not provide concrete guidance on how revenue-sharing schemes should be 
com bined with o ther transfer programs to achieve more optimal revenue 
assignments.
In this chapter we address these topics. One of our main conclusions 
is that revenue-sharing schemes should be limited to finance only those 
expenditure functions where subnational governments do not enjoy any 
significant degree o f discretion. In contrast, those functions where subna­
tional governments do enjoy a significant degree o f discretion should be 
financed primarily by own revenues and carefully designed equalization 
transfers.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the main principles to be considered in the design o f  subnational financial 
structure, paying particular attention to  revenue-sharing schemes. In 
Section 3 we review the characteristics o f  Latin American transfer systems; 
we highlight the m ost common patterns in the region and evaluate their 
performance. In Section 4 we propose a simple framework for the redesign 
o f the system o f intergovernmental transfers in the region. The last section 
concludes.
2 THE ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL  
TR ANSFERS IN FISCALLY DECENTRALIZED  
SYSTEMS
The classic economic justification for fiscal decentralization is due to Oates 
(1972), and focuses on the comparative advantages o f subnational gov­
ernm ents to determine the optimal provision of public goods within their 
jurisdiction. He argued that if preferences are not homogeneous across juris­
dictions and subnational governments are capable of providing goods and 
services efficiently, then allowing for the expenditure decisions to be made 
‘closer to the people’ would result in a better fit of each jurisdiction's prefer­
ences and therefore in welfare gains for society.1 This argument translates 
into the so-called ‘subsidiarity principle’, by which an expenditure respon­
sibility should be assigned to  the lowest level of government capable of effi­
ciently providing that function. Those services with spillover benefits beyond 
single jurisdictions should be provided by higher levels of government. In 
general, there seems to  be agreement about what expenditure responsi­
bilities should be assigned to subnational governments, and in practice most 
countries around the world decentralize similar expenditure functions.4
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On the revenue side o f the budget, however, both the debate and the 
practice of fiscal decentralization reforms are far from having reached 
consensus. In order to devolve effective decision-making powers and 
prom ote efficient expenditure choices at the subnational level, it is gen­
erally accepted that it is necessary to  ensure some degree o f  revenue 
autonom y. Revenue autonom y is also im portant because it enhances the 
accountability o f government officials and citizens’ participation. The 
problem is that revenue autonom y is also related to im portant efficiency 
costs. The presence o f  economies o f  scale in tax adm inistration, collec­
tions and enforcement usually implies that the subnational governments 
are less effective than the central governm ent in raising a given am ount 
o f  revenues for most tax instrum ents. After weighting benefits and costs 
o f own-revenue collections, it is generally efficient to provide less than 
full budgetary autonom y at the subnational level, thus decentralizing 
revenue sources in am ounts that are insufficient to cover all subnational 
expenditures.5
The overall asymmetric decentralization o f  expenditure responsibili­
ties and revenue sources leads to  fiscal disparities, roughly defined as the 
difference between the costs o f  providing the goods and services that a 
government is responsible for and the revenue that the same government 
is able to  gather from its assigned revenue sources. The m agnitude of 
fiscal disparities varies across different levels o f  governm ent and among 
governm ents at the same level, creating what are known as ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ imbalances, respectively. In terms o f  vertical imbalance the 
central government typically exhibits a negative fiscal disparity, whose 
absolute value is (by definition) equal to the sum o f all fiscal dispari­
ties at the subnational level. In addition, horizontal imbalances are also 
common because governm ents o f  the same level norm ally face dissimilar 
economic conditions, including the costs o f public service delivery, the 
needs o f different population groups, the size and elasticity o f  tax bases, 
and so on. Reducing vertical and horizontal imbalances necessarily 
requires the use o f intergovernm ental transfers, which thus become a fun­
dam ental com ponent of any well-functioning fiscally decentralized system 
o f government.
Although there is wide consensus am ong scholars and policy makers 
that own-source revenues and intergovernm ental transfers are both indis­
pensable sources o f subnational finance, there are no clear guidelines 
regarding their optimal com bination.6 The academic literature stresses the 
im portance o f own-revenue collections a t the subnational level, but the 
exact extent o f own-revenue collections is not precisely defined.7 In the fol­
lowing discussion we provide some principles to  be considered for the 
design o f an efficient structure o f  subnational revenues.
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Towards a Normative Prescription for Optimal (Subnational) Revenue 
Structure
A widely accepted principle o f fiscal decentralization design states that 
‘finance follows function’. This principle emphasizes that both the am ount 
of revenues required by a government as well as the adequate choice o f 
its revenue sources depend on the specific characteristics o f the assigned 
expenditure responsibilities and the cost o f  financing them (see, for 
example, Bahl, 1999). Although there are many ways to  categorize 
expenditure assignments to subnational governments, an essential distinc­
tion is whether: (i) the assignments correspond to own subnational respon­
sibilities, which explicitly call or rely on discretionary decisions made by 
subnational governments; or (ii) they correspond to  responsibilities that 
have been delegated to  the subnational governments by the central gov­
ernm ent, which fundam entally involve non-discretionary decisions by 
subnational governments. Note that, strictly speaking, subnational au ton­
omy is required if and only if an expenditure function has been assigned 
as an exclusive or own responsibility to the subnational level. In contrast, 
even though delegated functions are implemented by subnational govern­
ments, the ultimate responsibility over these functions may be interpreted 
as falling upon the central government. So discretion, if allowed, could 
only be exerted within certain limits and controls. Frequent examples of 
delegated expenditure responsibilities are education and health services. 
Service delivery in these sectors is normally assigned to  subnational gov­
ernments, and regardless o f whether or not the distinction is made in the 
law between own and delegated, significant shares o f the subnational edu­
cation and health budgets are devoted to meet national standards regard­
ing quality and coverage. In contrast, service delivery, for example, for 
street cleaning and lighting, whether or not the laws make the distinction 
between own and delegated responsibilities, generally are associated with 
decisions that are fully discretionary at the subnational level.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the ideal correspondence between subnational 
expenditures, divided into discretionary and non-discretionary categories, 
and subnational revenues. Assuming for expositional purposes and con­
venience that there are no savings, subnational revenues must be equal to 
subnational expenditures. The presence o f a vertical imbalance typically 
implies that subnational expenditures are larger than subnational own- 
revenue collections, and in order to eliminate this vertical imbalance the 
central government must provide additional resources in the form o f 
intergovernm ental transfers.8
Non-discretionary (delegated) expenditure responsibilities should be 
primarily financed, as it is conventionally accepted, by conditional
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Subnational Subnational
expenditures revenues
Discretionary 
decisions 
(on ‘own’ 
responsibilities)
Own subnational 
government 
revenues
Equalization
transfers
Non-discretionary 
decisions 
(on ‘delegated’ 
responsibilities)
Revenue
sharing
Conditional
transfers
Figure 9. /  Basic structure o f  subnational governments’ budget
intergovernmental transfers. If the central government is committed to 
achieving certain national standards then it should provide the 
funds required to ensure that those standards are met nationwide. 
Intergovernmental transfers are also necessary to finance own subnational 
responsibilities, but this financing must be unconditional in order to allow 
for discretionary subnational decisions.
Revenue sharing is a particular type o f intergovernm ental transfer 
in which a predeterm ined proportion  o f  central government collections 
from one or more tax instrum ents is set aside and distributed either on 
a derivation basis o r by form ula am ong subnational governments. This 
arrangem ent exploits the central governm ent's advantage in tax collection 
while allowing subnational governm ents to gain access to buoyant revenue 
sources and minimizing distortions due to  uncoordinated tax adm inistra­
tion and tax com petition (Rao, 2007). Revenue-sharing schemes are widely 
used in the world and represent a significant share of intergovernm ental 
transfers in most Latin American countries. In part, this is because they 
are considered an adequate means o f  providing greater revenue autonom y 
to subnational governments. Sometimes, due to a certain perception of 
entitlem ent, revenues shared on a derivation basis are (wrongly) labeled as 
subnational ‘ow n’ revenues.9
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Even though revenue sharing and other intergovernmental transfers are 
an im portant source o f  subnational revenues in many countries, unfor­
tunately the literature has not yet provided clear normative prescriptions 
regarding the extent to  which subnational finances should rely on these 
revenue sources. The conventional decentralization theory states only that 
subnational governments should be able to control the level o f  revenues at 
the margin (M cLure, 2000); but autonom y at the margin refers only to the 
ability to  alter the am ount o f own-revenue collections and says nothing 
about the revenue structure.
In particular, the existing literature has not properly emphasized the 
fact that intergovernm ental transfers are costless from the recipient gov­
ernm ents’ perspective, which means that they may not provide adequate 
inform ation about the marginal cost o f public funds. Such costs include 
the marginal costs o f  administering and collecting additional revenues as 
well as their social welfare costs, and they indicate the (minimum) level 
o f marginal benefits required for the last unit o f public expenditures to 
be economically desirable. Intergovernmental transfers substitute away 
own-tax revenues (and financial debt), and since the marginal cost o f 
public funds usually increases with the am ount o f own revenues, then the 
m arginal cost perceived by the subnational governments can be expected 
to decrease with the level o f intergovernmental transfers, and at any rate 
not to  match the actual marginal cost.10
Efficient autonom ous decisions in both public expenditures and own- 
revenue collections require that a government has a correct measure (or 
at least a close approxim ation) o f the marginal costs o f public funds, and 
aligning the marginal cost o f funds is one o f the main objectives of the inter­
governmental transfers.11 As Bird and Sm art (2002: 899) put it, ‘(t)he basic 
task in transfer design is to get prices “right” in the public sector’.
A lthough not readily obvious, the objective o f aligning the prices faced 
by subnational governm ents is entirely compatible with the traditional 
objectives reserved for an equalization transfer program . Equalization 
transfer programs are meant to reduce differences in the ability o f sub­
national governments o f  the same level to cover the cost of providing a 
standard package o f  public goods and services.12 In this context, the ‘right’ 
marginal cost o f public funds corresponds to that level at which subna­
tional governments collect the revenues required to finance the standard 
package o f public goods and services. Thus, an equalization transfer 
program  can serve to provide the subnational governments with the con­
ditions required to m ake elficient autonom ous decisions. O f course, the 
greater the equalization transfer fund, the greater the room  to effectively 
equalize subnational fiscal conditions.
N ote that besides the equalization transfers there is no need for
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additional transfer program s aimed at fostering decision-making au ton­
omy at the subnational levels o f government. M oreover, in order to ensure 
that the equalization transfer program  can effectively reach its objective, 
it would be desirable not to allow the sum o f conditional transfers and 
revenues shared on a derivation basis to exceed the am ount o f  expendi­
tures needed for delegated or non-discretionary functions. This condition 
should hold not only for each level o f subnational government taken as a 
whole, but also for each subnational government. Likewise, discretionary 
expenditure responsibilities should be financed primarily via own-revenue 
collections and equalization transfers, which can jointly inform subna­
tional policy makers about the correct level o f the marginal cost o f public 
funds.
3 INTE RG OV ERN M EN TA L TRANSFERS IN LATIN 
AMERICA
Even though most Latin American countries have been engaged in lengthy 
fiscal decentralization processes, subnational revenue autonom y is still 
limited. Revenues collected by regional and local governments in the 
region frequently represent a small fraction o f their revenues and in the few 
cases where they represent a sizable share of local budgets, generally they 
are not especially im portant in the national context. Table 9.1 shows the 
share o f  own-tax collections over total revenues at the local and regional 
levels in a group o f Latin American countries, as well as the relative im por­
tance o f  the two levels o f government in terms o f the distribution of rev­
enues in the public sector. All local governments in the sample collect less 
than 50 percent o f their own revenues. Chilean municipalities display the 
greatest share of own-tax collections, but in that case revenue autonom y is 
tempered by the limited extent o f the fiscal decentralization process in that 
country. At the regional level the experience is mixed. The Argentine prov­
inces collect a significant share o f  their revenues through turnover, stamp 
and property taxes, and the C olom bian departm ents are able to  raise some 
revenues from excise taxes. In o ther countries such as Bolivia, Mexico, 
Paraguay and Peru, however, regional governments collect few or no taxes.
This evidence suggests that m ost countries in the region suffer from 
significant vertical imbalances and a high level o f dependency on inter­
governmental transfers from the central governm ent.13 In order to  address 
these problems, all countries in the region are currently implementing a 
variety o f intergovernm ental transfer programs. In the following discus­
sion we provide an overview o f  transfer systems, and then we examine the 
possible equalizing and efficiency effects o f the main transfer program s.
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Table 9.1 Share o f  own taxes and fees on local revenues in 10 Latin 
American countries
Country (year) Local governments Regional governments
Share of own- 
tax collections 
on local 
revenues
Share of local 
revenues on 
general govt 
revenues
Share of own- 
lax collections 
on regional 
revenues
Share of 
regional 
revenues on 
general govt 
revenues
Argentina 2.0% 8.4% 68.9% 16.6%a
(2004) (2004) (2004) (2008)
Boliviab 17.2% 23.3% 0.0% 21.0%
(2007) (2007) (2007) (2007)
Brazil 20.1%C 9.0%c - 34.8%d
(2007) (2007) (2008)
Chile 48.1% 9.6%
(2006) (2006)
Colombia 34.8%« 22.9% 27.7%' 17.6%
(2008) (2003) (2008) (2003)
Costa Rica 36.2% 5.9%
(2006) (2006)
Ecuador0 34.6% 12.0%
(2007) (2007)
Mexico 15.6%c 6.0%c 2.7%f 40.6%f
(2007) (2007) (2006) (2006)
Paraguay 41.3% 6.2% 0.0% 2.1%
(2006) (2006) (2006) (2006)
Peru 10.8% 13.7% 0.0% 19.0%
(2005) (2005) (2005) (2005)
Sources: Government Finance Statistics (September 2010); “Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Censos, Argentina (considers only tax revenues): bZapata (2007);'Martinez- 
Vazquez (2010); '•National Treasury of Brazil; ‘Direccion Nacional de Planificacion 
(Colombia); Institu to  Nacional de Estadistica y Gcografia (Mexico, 2009).
Current Practices in Transfer Design14
Given the great diversity of intergovernmental transfer programs 
observed in Latin Am erica it is difficult to describe com m on strategies and 
approaches to address the problem of vertical imbalances. Programs vary 
widely in terms o f their funding rules, the distribution mechanisms and the 
conditions imposed on their use. In part, these variations respond to the 
different objective to be accomplished, but it is also common in the region
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to observe program s where there is no clear correspondence between 
design and objective, or where there are two or more rather incompatible 
objectives.
Examples o f well-designed and effective transfer program s can be found 
among the num erous conditional transfer program s implemented in the 
region. The use o f this type o f transfer in Latin America is not as extensive 
as in other regions o f  the world, but nevertheless a significant share o f 
subnational revenues is subject to one or more conditions. In general, they 
are especially effective in facilitating the fulfillment o f (minimum) national 
standards o f  services and in increasing the delivery o f services with positive 
externalities. Most countries have sizable transfer program s earm arked 
for either capital expenditures or im portant subnational functions such as 
education and health. For example, Bolivia, G uatem ala. N icaragua and 
Paraguay provide examples o f  capital transfers to local governments; El 
Salvador and Peru are cases where the municipal governments compete 
for the capital transfers through project proposals. In Brazil, conditional 
transfers for education and health are directed first to the states, which 
are prim arily responsible for these functions; in Chile, the transfers for 
these functions are distributed directly to  the local governments. There are 
also several examples o f conditional transfer program s directed to vulner­
able groups. In Bolivia, for example, there is a program  (Seguro Materno 
Infant if) aimed to finance health services for infants and m others, and in 
Peru a similar program  ( Vaso de Leche) covers basic nutrition needs of 
poor children, pregnant women and mothers.
The mechanisms for the funding o f transfer program s can be defined 
independently from the conditions imposed on the use o f  the transfers. 
One o f the most com m on ways to  finance transfer program s in the region 
is by defining revenue-sharing schemes, and several m ajor conditional 
transfer program s use this a lternative.15 In Colombia and Guatem ala 
revenue-sharing funding for local governments is conditional on being 
used for basic education, health, and infrastructure; and 25 percent o f rev­
enues from hydrocarbons and mining must be spent in roughly the same 
sectors in Venezuela. In addition. Nicaragua and Paraguay set a minimum 
proportion o f the revenue-sharing transfers received at the local level to 
be spent on capital infrastructure, and in Peru a similar rule applies to the 
funds received by regional governm ents, part o f which can only be spent 
on capital investments and infrastructure maintenance.
Given a certain am ount o f  revenues collected from the shared sources, 
the most im portant effect o f  revenue-sharing schemes is that they set, 
usually unam biguously, the size o f  the transfer funds. This characteristic 
makes such schemes useful in providing subnational governm ents with 
buoyant and predictable revenues, and for the same reasons they seem
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to be very attractive in ensuring a certain degree o f budgetary autonomy. 
This likely explains the popularity o f revenue-sharing schemes, and why 
the countries in the region often prefer to impose no conditions on the use 
of the most im portant transfer programs.
Virtually all Latin American countries use some form o f revenue- 
sharing scheme defined on the basis o f central government general rev­
enues or a group o f their most im portant taxes, such as personal income 
tax, value added tax (VAT) and other taxes on corporate profits or sales. 
In principle, this approach can be harmless, but serious problems can arise 
when: (i) the bases are volatile; (ii) the criteria to distribute them among 
subnational governm ents are not related to relative expenditure needs; 
and (iii) they represent a significant share o f subnational revenues.
An im portant example o f volatile transfers is given by those cases where 
the sharing bases are taxes on extractive industries, a somewhat common 
situation among countries with abundant natural resources. In Mexico, 
one-fifth o f the revenues collected by the states must be shared with their 
municipalities; tax-sharing revenues for municipalities in Bolivia and 
Nicaragua are also defined in terms of natural resources; and in Peru 50 
percent o f the revenues collected from the corporate income tax on extrac­
tive industries are shared with regional and local governments. In all these 
examples, the size o f  the transfer pool has been subject to wide fluctuations 
associated with changes in the international prices o f natural resources.
Revenues from taxes on extractive industries can be especially distor- 
tionary when shared on a derivation or origin basis. For example, the 
subnational share o f  the corporate income tax on gas, oil and minerals’ 
extractive industries in Peru, the canon and sobrecanon, is distributed 
exclusively among the regions, provinces and municipalities where the 
extraction o f the natural resources has taken place. A similar allocation 
arrangem ent is found in Bolivia, where m ost o f the revenues shared go to 
the regions in which they are collected, but a small fraction (less than 10 
percent) is reserved for regions with no natural resources. Ecuador and 
Venezuela are other examples o f countries where the revenues from extrac­
tive industries are shared on a derivation basis. The presence of natural 
resources is unlikely to  be correlated with the public expenditure needs in 
each jurisdiction; therefore, this allocation criterion can create severe eco­
nomic distortions a t the subnational levels o f government, as well as a per­
ception of unfairness regarding the way public funds are being distributed 
across the country. An additional problem related to this type of revenue 
is that it might provide a strong sense o f entitlement to the beneficiaries, 
who perceive it as a legitimate right that cannot be taken away. In Peru, 
for instance, discussions about how to solve the existing horizontal fiscal 
disparities have only led to proposals requiring new funds to compensate
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the losers, and any reform to the distribution mechanism o f the (already 
excessive) available funds is currently considered as politically unviable.
Less detrim ental, but not harmless, forms o f sharing revenues on a 
derivation basis are defined over bases more homogeneously distributed 
across the national or regional territory. The Brazilian states, for instance, 
have a tax-sharing scheme funded with 25 percent of their regional VAT 
revenues. From  this fund, 75 percent is distributed am ong municipalities 
on a derivation basis, and the rest by a form ula that considers population, 
land area and other variables.
A much better (if not the best) way to allocate unconditional shares 
o f  revenues consists in using form ulas that contain some equaliza­
tion features. This is a quite com m on approach  in Latin America, 
although each country seems to choose different equalizing objectives 
and im plem ents its own com binations o f funding m echanism s and 
distribution  criteria. In Brazil the am ount o f the Federal District and 
State Participation Fund (FPE) and the M unicipalities Participation 
Fund (FPM ) are defined, respectively, as 21.5 and 22.5 percent o f the 
revenues collected from  the three m ost im portant federal taxes (personal 
income tax, corporate  incom e tax and VAT). The FPE is distributed in 
fixed p roportions am ong the five m acro regions, with the objective o f  
reducing historical disparities. The poorest m acro region, the northeast, 
receives 52.46 percent o f  the fund; an additional 25.37 percent is allo­
cated to the north , and the rest to the center-west, southeast and south. 
The FPM  is distributed mainly in proportion  to the population  o f  each 
m unicipality, but for large m unicipalities an  adjustm ent by per capita 
income is introduced.
Equalization transfers in the region are most commonly financed by 
the central governments and distributed across subnational govern­
ments in accordance with some proxy for poverty or (expenditure) needs. 
Examples o f  these program s can be found in virtually all Latin American 
countries, although they broadly differ in their design and im portance in 
subnational public finances. O f course, equalization transfer program s do 
not need to  be financed exclusively by the center. An alternative approach 
in the region is given by the Chilean Com m on M unicipal Fund, which is 
financed by own revenues from the richest governments and distributed 
am ong the rest of the municipalities with a form ula that considers popula­
tion, poverty and other variables. This financing m ethod is known in the 
literature as a ‘fraternal’ system, in contrast to the traditional ‘paternal’ 
system in which the central governm ent provides all the funds o f the 
program . A nother distinctive experience is the FIIPC (heavily indebted 
poor countries initiative) transfer program  implemented in Bolivia, where 
the funds are provided by international organizations such as the W orld
Intergovernmental transfers: a policy reform perspective 271
Bank and the IM F, and distributed am ong local governments in accord­
ance with their relative population and poverty levels.
Equalization transfers are usually unconditional, but there are some 
interesting exemptions to this rule. The Peruvian Regional Compensation 
Fund (Fondo de Compensation Regional) and the Chilean N ational Fund 
for Regional Development (Fondo National de Desarrollo Regional) 
provide funds conditioned exclusively on capital expenditures at the 
regional level, and their distribution is based on equalizing objectives with 
explicit consideration o f poverty indicators.
However, addressing horizontal disparities with a sizable transfer 
program  exclusively devoted to the objective of equalization is not fre­
quent in the region. Revenue-sharing schemes can easily incorporate 
proxies for relative expenditure needs -  such as population and poverty 
ratios -  but it is m uch more difficult to correct for differences in fiscal 
capacity .16 In reality, the equalizing mechanisms used in the region do 
not provide explicit estimates o f expenditure needs, and the equalization 
o f fiscal capacity is usually not considered in the distribution formulas. 
The problem in this case is that one m onetary unit that cannot be col­
lected is exactly equivalent to one m onetary unit that is not available to 
cover expenditure needs. Thus, when fiscal capacity is disregarded it may 
simply not be possible to  equalize the ability to provide com parable public 
services across the country.
Critical Assessment o f Transfer Systems
Certain common characteristics of the intergovernmental transfer systems 
in Latin American countries are peculiar in the international context. 
In particular, the heavy reliance on revenue-sharing schemes and their 
distribution in accordance with some equalizing criteria are distinctive 
features o f Latin American subnational finances (M artinez-Vazquez,
2010). Instead o f  adequate adaptations to the regional reality, however, 
these arrangem ents suggest some degree o f  confusion regarding the role 
and consequences o f  this revenue source in a fiscally decentralized system 
o f government.
Revenue-sharing schemes provide subnational governments with pre­
dictable and usually buoyant revenues, but they might also be associated 
with im portant costs to  the public sector and the econom y as a whole. 
If the revenues shared represent a significant proportion of the public 
budget then they can be expected to  reduce the ability o f  the central 
governm ent to im plem ent desirable tax and expenditures policies. One 
example o f this situation  is observed in Peru, where the revenues shared 
increased their relative im portance due to  greater international prices
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Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, Peru.
Figure 9.2 Revenues shared over central government tax  collections in 
Peru
paid for Peruvian natural resources. Figure 9.2 presents the evolution 
o f  the ratio  o f  revenues shared with subnational governm ent over total 
central government tax collections. A t the beginning o f  the period, in 
2004, the revenues shared with regional and local governm ents repre­
sented only 2 percent o f  the total taxes collected by the central govern­
ment. W hen international prices reached their peak in 2007, however, 
the transfers to  subnational governm ents explained by revenue-sharing 
schemes represented more than 12 percent o f central governm ent tax 
collections. Even though these transfers are conditional on being spent 
on capital investments, they have been quite effective in boosting subna­
tional expenditures and, as a consequence, the central government has 
seen its ability to contro l the grow th o f the public sector in the margin 
diminished.
Revenue-sharing transfers to local governments have also reduced the 
effectiveness o f the FO N C O M U N  (Fondo de Com pensacion M unicipal), 
the only equalization transfer program  implemented at that level in Peru. 
Figure 9.3 shows the im portance o f  the equalization transfer program  
and the revenues shared in the transfers received by local governments. In 
2004 the equalization transfer program  represented half of the transfers 
received by local governm ents, but its im portance was reduced during 
the 2007^)9 period, mainly due to the increase in revenue sharing. Shared 
revenues were especially significant during 2007, and they remain the most
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Source: Ministry o f Economy and Finance, Peru.
Figure 9.3 Composition o f  intergovernmental transfers to local 
governments in Peru
im portant transfer program  for both local and regional governments in 
the country.
A peculiar characteristic of some revenue-sharing schemes in Latin 
Am erica is their m ulti-purpose design, which in some cases includes the 
equalization objective. This practice might help not only to avoid the 
creation o f new horizontal inequalities, but also to reduce, to  some extent, 
the disparities already encountered in the region. This is a particularly 
relevant topic in Latin America, where individual and regional disparities 
are relatively large by international s tandards.17 Table 9.2 presents two 
simple measures o f  regional disparities in G D P per capita for five Latin 
Am erican countries. Mexico has the greatest regional disparities. The ratio 
o f per capita G D P  between the richest state (Campeche) and the poorest 
state (either Oaxaca or Chiapas) is more than 14-fold and does not show 
any decreasing tendency. On the other hand, the coefficient o f variation 
o f  per capita G D P  for the sample of Mexican states is greater than 1 for 
the whole period and reaches a peak o f  1.57 in 2006.18 O ther countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil and Peru display smaller disparities but they 
are still large com pared to those found in other economies in the world. 
Rodriguez-Pose and  Gill (2004), for instance, com pute the coefficient o f 
variation for several developed countries, all o f which arc smaller than 
0.30 in 2000, while other developing countries, such as China and India, 
display a coefficient o f  variation o f 0.58 and 0.44, respectively. Bolivia is
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Table 9.2 Disparities in regional per capita GDP in five  Latin American 
countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina 
max / min 7.89 8.10 8.79 8.14 7.94 7.84
coefficient of 0.70 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.76 0.77 - -
variation 
Bolivia 
max / min 2.69 2.81 2.64 2.69 3.06 4.14 3.51 4.02
coefficient of 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.55
variation 
Brazil 
max / min 8.45 9.60 9.51 9.45 9.06 9.05
coefficient of 0.44 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53
variation 
Mexico 
max / min 14.66 15.07 14.35 15.09 17.05 17.26 19.28 18.48
coefficient of 1.14 1.17 1.16 1.24 1.40 1.40 1.57 1.40
variation
Peru
max / min 10.89 11.29 12.25 11.37
coefficient of - - - - 0.60 0.61 0.69 0.65
variation
Source: ECLAC, based on national official statistics.
the country with the lowest fiscal disparities in the sample, but this result is 
partially explained by the high poverty rates present throughout the whole 
country.
Per capita G D P  can be expected to be negatively correlated with needs 
but positively with tax collection capacity. In that context, a sizable and 
well-designed equalization transfer program  is particularly im portant to 
ensure that similar standards o f quality and quantity in the provision of 
public goods are met nationally. In Latin America, however, the equalizing 
objective does not always play a significant role in the financing o f subna­
tional governments. Table 9.3 presents the correlation between per capita 
G D P  and per capita transfers received from revenue-sharing schemes and 
other transfer program s for the same group o f countries. In Argentina, 
virtually all transfers to  the interm ediate level o f government are provided 
through revenue-sharing mechanisms; the positive correlation between 
this revenue source and regional G D P  suggests that the overall transfer 
system has an unequalizing outcom e. In Brazil, revenue-sharing transfers
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Table 9.3 Correlation between regional per capita GDP and transfers to 
the regions in five Latin American countries
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Argentina 
GDP -  revenue 0.23 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.23
sharing 
Bolivia 
GDP -  revenue 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.68 0.71
sharing 
Brazil 
GDP -  revenue 0.03 -0.22 -0.30 -0.30 -0.29 -0.31
sharing 
G D P -o th e r -0.17 0.06 0.41 * 0.35 0.39 0.40
transfers 
Mexico 
G D P -  revenue 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.58 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.57
sharing 
GDP -  other 0.23 0.09 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.18 0.20
transfers
Peru 
G D P -  revenue 0.19 0.72 0.79 0.80
sharing 
G D P -  other 0.31 0.50 0.38 0.07
transfers
Notes: For Argentina all transfers to provincial governments are considered as shared 
revenues. Revenues shared in Bolivia consist of royalties and taxes applied on the 
exploitation o f natural resources. Brazilian revenue-sharing transfers are computed as the 
participation on the federal revenues plus the compensation for the exploitation of natural 
resources. In the case o f  Mexico, the revenues shared are given by the participaciones and 
the other transfers by the aportaciones, which are generally defined as conditional transfers. 
Revenue-sharing transfers in Peru consist o f canon, sobrecanon and mining royalties, all of 
them defined as Gorporate income tax on extractive industries.
Source: Own computations based on ECLAC data.
have displayed a negative sign since 2003, implying that they are benefiting 
more those states with low per capita G D P. That is the intended role o f 
those transfers in Brazil, which, as we saw above, are set as fixed propor­
tions favoring the poorer macro regions o f the country. In contrast, other 
transfers in that country  appear to be positively correlated with per capita 
G D P, suggesting poor equalizing effects in terms of per capita GDP. In 
Mexico and Peru, the two transfer aggregates also show a positive and 
high correlation, although the transfers that are different from revenue
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Table 9.4 Variability o f  per capita revenues in Peruvian municipalities, 
2008 (in US dollars*)
Own T ransfers Total revenues Equalization Total
revenues other than 
equalization
minus
equalization
transfers
transfers revenues
(1) (2) (l)+ (2 ) (3) (D+(2)+(3)
Simple 14.6 125.8 140.5 46.3 186.7
average
Weighted 31.4 64.0 95.3 28.5 123.9
average
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 19.9
Maximum 930.3 8,520.3 9,158.1 448.1 9,184.4
Standard 48.8 350.4 370.0 42.9 374 5
deviation
Coefficient of 1.6 5.5 3.9 1.5 3.0
variation**
Count 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834 1,834
Note: * 1 US dollar = 2.87885 nuevos soles. ** The coefficient of variation is computed as 
(he ratio between the standard deviation and the weighted average.
Source: Own computations based on data from the Ministry o f Economy and Finance, 
Peru.
sharing -  those with equalization criteria -  display a lower unequalizing 
effect.
The results in Table 9.3 are suggestive, but much m ore data-based evi­
dence would be necessary in order to  assess the overall equalizing effects 
o f intergovernmental transfer program s currently implemented in Latin 
America. Per capita G D P  m ight be related to the fiscal capacity o f sub­
national governments, but that is not necessarily the case nor is it entirely 
clear how per capita G D P  might be related to the needs o f  subnational 
public services.
With the limited data available, a com plem entary way to  evaluate the 
equalizing effects o f the intergovernm ental transfer program s is to verify 
whether they have served to  reduce the variability o f per capita subna­
tional revenues. In Table 9.4 we present a set o f basic statistics about 
per capita revenues at the municipal level in Peru during 2008. Some 
municipalities collect no revenues, but there is one (Santa M aria del M ar, 
in Lima) that collects US$930.3 per capita. The simple and weighted aver­
ages for the 1,834 municipalities are US$14.6 and US$31.4, respectively.
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and the coefficient o f  variation is 1.6, which suggests that the variability 
o f own-revenue collections among Peruvian municipalities in rather high. 
The second column describes the distribution o f transfers different from 
the equalization program , including those from revenue-sharing schemes. 
The total am ount o f  these transfers is more than twice the am ount o f own 
revenues, and with the simple average larger than the weighted average, it 
is implied that less populated municipalities tend to  receive higher trans­
fers per capita. Again, some municipalities receive no transfers, but others 
receive substantial am ounts, mainly from the canon, sobrecanon and 
mining royalties which, as explained above, are distributed on a derivation 
basis. N ote that the greatest am ount o f per capita transfers received by a 
municipality, US$8,520.3 transferred to the municipality o f  Ilabaya in 
Tacna, is 68 times greater than average per capita (total) revenues in the 
country, equal to USS 123.9. The coefficient of variation for these trans­
fers is 5.5, indicating huge differences in the allocation o f transfers across 
municipalities.
Even though we are not considering local expenditure needs in these cal­
culations, it is safe to conclude that transfers (other than those for equali­
zation) are creating m ajor horizontal imbalances at the local level in Peru. 
The total am ount o f municipal revenues minus the equalization transfer 
has a coefficient o f  variation equal to 3.9, which is very large under any 
standard. On the o ther hand, equalization transfers (distributed through 
the FO N C O M U N  program ) also display a relevant degree o f  variability, 
but that variability seems to be helping to reduce horizontal disparities, 
given that the coefficient o f variation is falling from 3.9 to 3.0. In any case, 
because o f either its limited size or problems with its design (distribu­
tion criteria, and so on), horizontal disparities remain very large and the 
equalization program  has had a limited equalizing effect in that country. 
N ote that the m inimum am ount o f per capita equalization transfers is 
greater than zero, which implies that even those municipalities receiving 
disproportionate am ounts o f resources from the revenue-sharing scheme 
are defined as beneficiaries o f the equalization transfer program .19
The case o f Peru is not representative o f  all countries in the region, 
but there are some common aspects that deserve to be emphasized. Latin 
American countries often understand the fiscal decentralization system 
itself simply as the sharing of central government revenues, without 
requiring the additional revenues to be properly linked to the level and 
type o f subnational public expenditures (M artinez-Vazquez. 2010).
In general, the excessive reliance on revenue sharing and the correspond­
ing small share o f own subnational revenue collections have led to limited 
accountability and  to a soft-budget constraint problem in the region 
(A hm ad and Brosio, 2008). In order to solve this problem we suggest
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strengthening the link between revenues and expenditure by implementing 
equalization transfer program s that are capable o f correcting the marginal 
cost o f  funds faced by the subnational governments. This solution must 
be accom panied by the introduction o f  adequate measures o f  expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacity, as well as by initiatives to  improve own-revenue 
collections in the region (M artinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 2012).20 In 
addition, revenues shared on a derivation basis should be reduced to a 
magnitude at which they do not prevent the equalization transfer system 
o f correcting the m arginal cost o f  public funds faced by the subnational 
governments.
4 THE ARCHITECTURE OF A N  IDEAL  
INTE RG O V ERN M EN TA L T R AN SFER  SYSTEM
A sound financial structure at the subnational level is essential for the 
success o f  the fiscal decentralization process. U nfortunately, despite exten­
sive international practice and academic research on this issue, it is still 
unclear what the ideal structure o f  the intergovernm ental transfer system 
should be. In this section we review the basic principles for structuring the 
intergovernm ental transfer system and take a look at very simple alterna­
tives to implement an elficient and  fair subnational fiscal structure.
Different types o f intergovernm ental transfers are available to policy 
makers, but the proper choice is necessarily linked to  the specific objec­
tives that are being pursued. The literature distinguishes several possible 
objectives, am ong which the following may be the most im portant:21
•  reducing vertical imbalances;
•  ensuring national standards o f  certain public goods and services;
•  financing development programs;
•  correcting for positive and negative externalities;
•  reducing horizontal imbalances; and
•  enhancing fiscal autonom y.
Provided that subnational governm ents are generally not able to collect 
by themselves all the funds required to fulfill their expenditure responsibil­
ities, any transfer from the central government to the subnational govern­
ments helps reduce any existing vertical imbalance. The main questions in 
this regard are: (i) what is the size o f  the vertical imbalance; and  (ii) to what 
extent is the country willing and able to reduce that imbalance?22 Once the 
total am ount o f funds available for intergovernm ental transfers has been 
determined, the specific allocation criteria can be chosen in accordance
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with the other objectives that are going to  be pursued. Each policy objec­
tive can better be served with certain types o f  intergovernmental transfers, 
and it is usually preferable to use a separate transfer program  to pursue 
each single objective. This allows for clarity of purpose and design and 
facilitates the evaluation o f particular transfer programs.
One o f  the most im portant objectives o f  intergovernmental transfer 
program s is to ensure that minimum quantity and/or quality stand­
ards are met across the national territory. This objective is very broad 
and it implies that subnational governments may not be given full 
discretion over expenditure decisions. In this sense, we can think of 
minimum standard requirements as a way to define delegated or non- 
discretionary responsibilities -  or non-discretionary com ponents within 
certain responsibilities -  as opposed to own responsibilities where the sub­
national governments enjoy full autonom y o r discretion over expenditure 
decisions.2-1 In other words, these transfers may be conditional in nature. 
There are many possible examples, but two especially im portant cases are 
transfers for education and health, where the central government usually 
sets national standards and retains a great deal o f control over subna­
tional expenditure decisions. O ther examples are the transfer programs for 
supporting pregnant women, children at risk, and the elderly.
Development program s can have national or subnational scope, 
depending on the design of the development strategy. Transfers in support 
of this objective are usually conditional on being spent on capital expen­
ditures, but can plausibly be given for current expenditures as well.24 The 
theoretical literature gives especial im portance to the role o f correcting 
externalities. A dditional transfers, plausibly determined through m atch­
ing schemes, can help to encourage greater expenditures o f  subnational 
governments in those functions with positive externalities outside the 
borders o f  subnational jurisdictions.
Once all revenue sources have been determined and the central govern­
ment has transferred the resources necessary to attain national standards 
and development goals, then governments o f the same level will display sig­
nificant differences in financing abilities. These differences are referred to 
as ‘horizontal im balances’, and are addressed through equalization trans­
fer programs. Presuming that the central government has provided the 
funds necessary to fund all delegated functions, the need for equalization 
is fundamentally related to the financing o f  own-expenditure functions. As 
a consequence, equalization transfers should serve to enhance subnational 
fiscal autonom y, and thus they usually are defined as unconditional. Fiscal 
autonom y is a necessary condition for efficient subnational decisions, and 
therefore it is by itself considered as an objective of the transfer program. 
Provided that there is some degree o f tax autonom y, with a sizable
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unconditional equalization program  in place, however, there is no need 
for any other transfer program  to  pursue the objective o f fiscal autonom y.
All in all, the design o f the transfer system can roughly be organized 
into four types o f  transfers to  be applied sequentially. First, the central 
governm ent should attem pt to  provide conditional transfers in am ounts 
close to the cost o f delegated functions, such that national standards of 
quality and quantity  can be met by all subnational governments. Second, 
a different program  o f conditional transfers could be set in order to 
finance developm ent program s, either o f regional scope o r as a part o f 
local developm ent initiatives. Third, m atching grants, which are essen­
tially conditional, could be provided in order to  foster expenditures in 
socially desirable and sensitive services, including those with positive 
externalities.25 F ourth , the equalization transfer program  based on dif­
ferences in expenditure needs and fiscal capacity acts as the balancing 
instrum ent for the whole system o f subnational revenues. If defined as 
unconditional it allows for adjusting the am ounts o f discretionary expen­
ditures, while the precise am ount given to each subnational government 
also helps to bring the cost o f  public funds faced by each jurisdiction 
closer to  the optim al level.
These transfers can be defined separately for any level o f  subnational 
government and for both current and capital expenditures. O f course, lim­
iting the use o f transfers to capital purposes makes them conditional, but 
such a broad limitation might still leave room for autonom ous choices as 
well as for additional conditions in terms o f specific functions and services 
(Herrero-Alcalde et al., 2010). N ote that from a theoretical viewpoint, 
revenue-sharing schemes are simply not necessary, and tha t the only key 
com ponents o f the transfer system are the conditional transfers and the 
equalization program . Indeed, absent externalities it is possible to think 
o f a situation where only these two types o f program  provide all the funds 
that subnational governm ents require in addition to their own-revenue 
collections.
The Architecture of Equalization Transfer Programs
Bahl and Bird (2008) argue tha t an intergovernmental transfer system 
capable o f offsetting the dis-equalizing effects o f  subnational taxation is 
a precondition for a successful decentralization o f significant revenue- 
raising powers. This is largely a non-controversial issue in the design 
o f  decentralized systems; however, most countries in Latin America do 
not have an equalization program  in place, and the existing equalization 
mechanisms usually have very limited equalizing power. In the following 
discussion we briefly describe some o f the most im portant concepts related
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to the design and implementation of an effective equalization transfer 
program .
Equalization transfers are intended to  provide subnational govern­
ments o f the same level with similar opportunities to deliver public goods 
and services o f  com parable quality in spite o f  their dissimilar conditions. 
On the one hand, some o f the dissimilar conditions can be observed on 
the expenditure side o f  the budget. Different governments are faced with 
different costs and even production functions, as well as with different 
needs o f  the population arising, for example, from age com position. The 
concept summarizing these factors is called ‘expenditure needs', defined as 
the cost of providing a standard am ount and quantity o f public goods and 
services to the local community. On the o ther hand, on the revenue side of 
the budget governm ents are faced with different adm inistration capacity, 
tax bases, compliance culture and behavioral responses to  taxation. These 
factors determine that jurisdictions can differ in their ability to collect 
revenues to cover their expenditure needs. In this context, fiscal capacity 
can be defined as the ability o f a government to collect revenues from the 
assigned sources at a given marginal cost and level o f fiscal effort.
The difference between expenditure needs (EN) and fiscal capacity (FC) 
is equal to what in the literature has been called ‘fiscal disparity’ (FD):
FD, = EN i -  FCj,
where the subscript / denotes any jurisdiction.26 If the fiscal disparity o f 
jurisdiction i is positive (negative) then its government has, under standard 
conditions, less (more) funds than required in order to cover its expendi­
ture needs. In this context, horizontal imbalances might be defined as 
the differences in per capita fiscal disparities across jurisdictions, and the 
objective o f the equalization transfer problem is the reduction of those 
differences.27 In practice, however, equalization transfer program s around 
the world vary in term s o f what their objective is (see Table 9.5). In some 
cases the equalization is based only on expenditure needs: in others only 
on fiscal capacity; and there are also many examples where both factors 
are considered.
By considering exclusively either expenditure needs or fiscal capacity 
one would implicitly assume that the o ther factor does not significantly 
vary across jurisdictions. This could plausibly be true; but it does not seem 
to be the case in Latin American countries where regional inequalities are 
pronounced and in m ost cases arising (to different extents) from both sides 
of the budget. M oreover, since one additional m onetary unit o f expendi­
ture needs is equivalent to  one monetary unit loss o f fiscal capacity, then it 
is correct to consider both factors as equally important.
Table 9.5 Equalization goals, allocation factors and international practice
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Goals Factors Country examples
Enable similar levels of 
service affordability
Enable similar levels 
of fiscal resource 
availability 
Enable similar levels of 
service at similar 
levels of taxation
Expenditure needs 
indicators, or national 
expenditure standards
Fiscal capacity indicators
Fiscal disparity = 
Expenditure needs -  Fiscal 
capacity, or some other 
combination of need and 
capacity
India, Italy, Nigeria’s 
Federation Account, 
South Africa’s Equitable 
Shares, Spain, Uganda’s 
Unconditional Grant 
Canada’s Equalization 
Grant
Australia, China, 
Germany, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Netherlands’ Municipal 
Fund, Russia, Uganda’s 
Equalization Grant, 
United Kingdom
Source: Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007).
The implementation o f  an equalization transfer program  can be struc­
tured in three steps. First, it is necessary to determine the size o f the 
transfer fund. The total am ount o f equalization transfers should be, in 
principle, related to the excess o f  expenditure needs over potential rev­
enues different from the equalization transfer itself. In practice, however, 
the size o f  the transfer fund depends m ore generally on the chosen 
funding system,28 the availability o f  financial resources at the national 
level, and on political constraints. A lthough some countries attem pt to 
almost fully equalize horizontal disparities (for example, Germany), typi­
cally the overall funds made available are insufficient to fully eliminate 
existing fiscal disparities.
The second step consists in estim ating relative fiscal disparities. It is 
usually not possible to  accurately com pute the actual fiscal disparity of 
each subnational governm ent. Instead, and depending on the quality o f 
the inform ation available, a country can rely on a num ber o f  m ethodolo­
gies to estim ate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity in relative terms for 
all subnational governm ents.29 In general, it is not recommended to base 
the estim ation of fiscal disparities on historical data related to actual 
spending and revenues. On the one hand, historical budgets might have 
been poorly assigned, and thus not associated with efficient fiscal deci­
sions. On the other hand, doing this would provide perverse incentives
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because subnational authorities would easily learn to spend more and 
collect less in order to  increase transfers in the future.
There are several methodologies available for estimating expendi­
ture needs; unfortunately, the most attractive options are also the most 
inform ation intensive and require data that are usually unavailable in 
developing countries. A feasible and effective option may be the com puta­
tion o f per client expenditure norms adjusted for cost differences across 
jurisdictions. Under this methodology we only need to  determine the total 
am ount of resources to  be spent in the most im portant subnational func­
tions or programs, and then compute the norm by dividing this am ount 
by the total num ber o f  clients that are intended to receive the benefits o f 
the program . The expenditure norm  might be adjusted to reflect cost dif­
ferences across jurisdictions, and it corresponds to a nationwide per client 
expenditure need. The client-based expenditure norm may have a pre­
scriptive or suggestive character, but in any case it facilitates the national 
debate about fiscal policy reforms.
The estimation o f fiscal capacity determines how much revenue each 
government can raise from its own sources with a standard level o f tax 
effort (and allowing for all other transfers received different from equali­
zation). When subnational governments have some degree of discretion 
over tax sources, the standard level o f effort is sometimes represented by 
the effective tax rate, defined as the ratio o f  revenue collections over the 
tax base. In general, however, what m atters in not only the tax rate but 
also the marginal collection costs faced by each local government. From  
an optim al taxation perspective, and in order to minimize the costs o f the 
tax system, the m arginal cost o f public funds collected must be equalized 
across all governments o f the same level. Moreover, since the resultant 
measure o f fiscal capacity is based on equal conditions for all subnational 
governments o f the same level, then it can be considered as both fair and 
efficient.
In practice, however, the estimation o f fiscal capacity in developing 
countries is challenging due to limited data  availability. There are m eth­
odologies, such as the representative tax system, that provide appropriate 
approxim ations o f  fiscal capacity, but the data requirements may be out 
o f reach for most Latin American countries.30 More practical solutions 
might be to consider, at least temporarily while the inform ation systems 
are developed, either averages o f historical collections, or proxies for the 
size o f the tax bases assigned to the subnational governments. The first 
o f  these alternatives is not ideal because historical revenues might not be 
obtained under fairly equal and efficient conditions, but at least the use of 
an average o f several years would reduce the perverse incentives on rev­
enues and expenditure decisions. The second methodology is preferable.
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but good proxies such as the G D P  in the jurisdiction are usually unavail­
able. The implementation o f this methodology might be more feasible in 
a second stage o f the reform, when more and better da ta  are available to 
subnational governments.
The third step in the im plem entation o f an  equalization transfer 
program  is to  com pute the am ount o f  transfers to  be assigned to  each 
subnational governm ent. If the fiscal disparity o f  a governm ent is posi­
tive then its expenditure needs exceed its fiscal capacity and a transfer 
will be necessary in o rder to im prove its fiscal situation. On the con­
trary, if  the result is negative then the m unicipality will have m ore 
resources than  it needs (according to  the established standards) and no 
transfer will be justified. Excluding those subnational governm ents with 
negative fiscal disparities from  the benefits o f  the equalization transfer 
program  is a simple and effective way to im prove the equalizing power 
o f  the equalization transfer p rogram .31 Equalization transfers can be 
assigned simply in proportion  to the size o f the positive fiscal disparities, 
o r by prioritizing the governm ents with the greatest fiscal disparity per 
capita.
Finally, it is im portant to note that equalization transfers are not neces­
sarily restricted to current expenditures. The expenditure responsibilities 
assigned to subnational government require both current and capital 
expenditures, and as such autonom ous efficient decisions over a flow of 
capital financing might also result in economic gains from greater alloca­
tion efficiency. This is a rather unexplored topic in the literature, and one 
where international experience is still not developed. A good example 
is given by the Regional C om pensation Fund, the equalization transfer 
program  for capital expenditures a t the regional level in Peru. In reality, 
however, the im plementation of this program  is more an attem pt to con­
strain the use o f the equalization funds than an innovative solution to 
the problems o f improving equity and efficiency. Indeed, in Peru regional 
governm ents do not receive unconditional equalization transfers, and at 
the local level the governm ents are not given equalization transfers for 
capital spending.
In a recent paper, H errero-Alcalde et al. (2010) suggest a methodology 
for a new capital transfer program  for Spanish autonom ous communities, 
where a portion  of the transfer is given with the objective o f equalizing the 
ability o f  governments to  regularly improve and m aintain their stock of 
capital, and another portion is intended to offset historical differences in 
the accum ulated stock o f  capital. This is a new area of research that offers 
alternatives to decentralized countries to  improve the allocation of the 
available funds am ong subnational governments for capital investment 
purposes.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Latin American countries have long been involved in fiscal decentrali­
zation reforms, but in general they have not yet come up with efficient 
arrangem ents for subnational government financing. Some o f the main 
problem s in the region are the excessive dependency on revenue-sharing 
arrangem ents, poor revenue collection performance at the subnational 
levels, and inadequate or unim portant equalization schemes. This situa­
tion has weakened the accountability mechanisms and the perceived link­
ages between tax and expenditure decisions.
The fiscal decentralization literature describes some o f the necessary 
conditions for a well-functioning subnational fiscal structure, but it is 
rather ambiguous regarding its com position and the extent to which 
revenue-sharing schemes might be used w ithout distorting the incentives 
faced by subnational governments. In this chapter we provide a novel 
analysis o f the problem  and conclude that revenue sharing should be used, 
if at all, to finance only non-discretionary (or delegated) expenditure func­
tions. Own (discretionary) expenditure functions, in contrast, should be 
associated with an efficient (positive) marginal cost of public funds, which 
can plausibly be set in a com bination o f own-revenue collections and a 
well-designed equalization transfer program.
O ur analysis suggests that Latin American countries might signifi­
cantly improve their decentralization systems by reducing their reliance 
on revenue-sharing schemes and expanding and improving the design of 
sizable equalization transfer programs. These program s can help reduce 
horizontal imbalances and, when com bined with significant own-revenue 
autonom y, provide subnational governments with the right incentives to 
spend efficiently and develop their own tax collection capacity.
This chapter also provides general guidelines on how to proceed with 
the design and im plem entation of equalization transfer systems in Latin 
Am erican countries. Sophisticated methodologies for the com putation of 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity might not be feasible due to limited 
data  availability, but useful good alternatives exist that can be readily 
implemented in the region.
NOTES
* We are grateful to ECLAC for financial support and to Giorgio Brosio and Juan Pablo 
Jimenez for helpful comments. We are also indebted to Andrea Podesta, Janet Porras, 
Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza and Gabriel Leonardo for useful research assistance.
1. We follow a common practice in the literature and use the term 'subnational' to refer 
to all government units under the central (or national) level. We distinguish two
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subnational levels of government: the intermediate or regional level, which in Latin 
America may also be said to consist o f states, departments or provinces; and the local 
or municipal level.
2. The m inor importance o f own revenues and the absence o f equalization transfers might 
have a common origin. In particular, heavier reliance on own revenues typically comes 
together with great disparities in the economic base and thus makes the introduction of 
an equalization transfer program much more necessary.
3. Oates (1999, 2006) offers updated discussions about the gains and challenges o f fiscal 
decentralization reforms.
4. McLure and Martinez-Vazquez (2004) and Shah (2004) provide overviews on the inter­
national practices in expenditure assignments.
5. Another important aspect to be considered is the decentralization of tax administra­
tion. Local government accountability may be enhanced when local governments 
administer and enforce their own taxes (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2010).
6. Subnational borrowings are an additional financial source for subnational govern­
ments, but in practice few countries, most o f them developed, have been able to extend 
successfully the use o f financial debt among subnational governments. In developing 
countries it is common to observe that only the capital and a few other large municipali­
ties have gained access to private credit markets.
7. Some general rules o f thumb have been provided. One is that autonom ous revenues 
should be sufficient to finance the expenditure responsibilities o f the richest subnational 
governments. In the following discussion we shall see that even though this can be a 
good approximation, it can fall short o f typifying an optimal assignment o f revenues.
8. Estimating the size of the vertical imbalance is a complex task. As argued in Canavire- 
Bacarreza et al. (2010), any estimation of the vertical imbalances requires, among other 
things, an explicit methodology for estimating expenditure needs (corresponding to the 
current expenditure assignments) and estimates of own-revenue capacity and all types of 
transfers. In practice, the decision about the actual amount o f intergovernmental transfers 
tends to rest more on political than on technical considerations (Bird and Tarasov, 2004).
9. Strictly speaking, the label ‘own’ revenues should be reserved for those taxes for which 
subnational governments have some control over the rates or the tax base; or at least 
over the final amount o f revenue collections. By definition, all forms o f revenue sharing 
are excluded from that category.
10. Similarly, Smart (1998) argues that (equalization) transfers reduce the marginal cost of 
funds for subnational governments.
11. According to optimal taxation theory, subnational revenues should be assigned in such 
a way that the marginal cost o f public funds is equalized across levels o f government 
and governments o f  the same level. See, for instance, Dahlby and Wilson (1994).
12. In Section 4 we shall discuss the objectives and design of equalization transfer programs 
in more detail.
13. Although the presence o f vertical imbalances is rather obvious, their actual extent is 
unknown due to the lack o f estimates o f the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity o f the 
different levels o f government in each country.
14. This section draws partially on Martinez-Vazquez (2010), who offers an exhaustive 
review of government financing practices at the local level in Latin American countries.
15. Jimenez and Podesta (2009) provide a comprehensive overview of intergovernmental 
transfer systems in Latin America and emphasize the volatility o f the central taxes 
shared with subnational governments.
16. Higher fiscal capacity calls for fewer transfers, but implementing a downward adjust­
ment o f the transfer amounts can be technically challenging or politically difficult. 
Theoretically, there would not be any problem if the proxies used to account for 
expenditure needs arc negatively (and perfectly) correlated with fiscal capacity, but that 
would rarely be the case.
17. Goni et al. (2008) describe the extent o f individual inequalities in the region and discuss 
the causes o f the poor performance of redistributive policies.
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18. The coefficient o f  variation is computed as the ratio between the standard deviation and 
the simple average o f per capita GDP.
19. O f course, the equalizing effect of the program could easily be increased by excluding 
these municipalities from its benefits, but this has not been done yet.
20. A natural consequence of incorporating fiscal capacity into the equalization formula 
would be that those subnational governments better able to cover their expenditure 
needs would be excluded from the benefits o f the program. This means that the avail­
able funds can reduce horizontal imbalances more effectively because more resources 
would be available to the jurisdictions with greater fiscal disparities.
21. The literature on intergovernmental transfers is extensive. Introductory expositions can 
be found, for instance, in Bahl and Linn (1994), Bird and Smart (2002), Schroedcr and 
Smoke (2003), Boadway (2007) and Martinez-Vazquez and Searle (2007).
22. There is no single best way to measure vertical imbalance, but most of the measures 
used look at what share of subnational government responsibilities cannot be financed 
with own revenues. Clearly, how well the vertical imbalance is rcduced depends on 
how the expenditure needs of subnational governments are defined. For a given set of 
expenditure standards, the country may be willing or able to satisfy only a part or all of 
those expenditure needs. The lower the standards defined for the expenditure needs the 
easier it becomes to reduce the vertical imbalance. Thus the existence and measurement 
o f vertical imbalance depend critically on the quantification o f expenditure needs and 
the extent o f revenue autonomy at the subnational level.
23. In some countries the minimum standards are notional (as opposed to compulsory) and 
they are only employed for budgetary computations. For instance, minimum standards 
can be implicitly defined in the estimation o f expenditure needs in an equalization 
formula, and subnational governments can employ the received funds without any con­
ditionality. This is the practice, for example, in Ukraine (Martinez-Vazquez and Thirsk,
2011).
24. Searle and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) offer an extensive discussion on conditional or tied 
grants.
25. Creating disincentives for certain expenditures with negative externalities would require 
economic sanctions, which might be implemented, for instance, as a reduction of 
equalization transfers.
26. Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) and Dafflon (2007) provide surveys of alterna­
tive definitions o f  fiscal disparity, most o f which are directly related to the concept of 
expenditure needs, fiscal capacity, or their combination.
27. Fiscal disparities are more easily defined in per capita terms for comparability purposes.
28. The funding rule could be a revenue-sharing scheme or left as an ad hoc decision to be 
determined in the annual national budget. Predictable and stable sources o f revenues 
are preferable because they provide more certainty for subnational budgets.
29. A revision of the methodologies described in the literature can be found in Boex and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2007). See also US AC1R (1986. 1990, 1993) for more detailed dis­
cussions on fiscal capacity estimations.
30. A description of this methodology can be found, for instance, in US ACIR (1993).
31. Under a 'fraternal’ (or Robin Hood) system like the one used in Chile, the pool o f funds 
would be fed with contributions from those jurisdictions with negative fiscal disparities. 
This is a way to perform faster equalization across jurisdictions but is not always politi­
cally acceptable.
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